
Measuring the efficiency of SDN mitigations against cyber attacks


Ralph Koning Ben de Graaff, Robert Meijer, Cees de Laat, Paola Grosso

System and Network Engineering research group Universiteit van Amsterdam

Context



SARNET Control loop



Detection phase: Detect, Classify, Analyze **Decision phase:** Risk, Decide **Response phase:** Respond, Adjust, Measure Learn phase: Learn (with input from other phases)

$\textbf{Detect} \rightarrow \underline{\textbf{Decide}} \rightarrow \textbf{Respond}$

There are <u>multiple ways</u> of responding to a single attack.


To select the right countermeasure the response phase executes:


- Risk analysis (we will omit this since we cannot quantify risk)
- **Response** selection

How does one pick the most effective countermeasure to defend against an attack?

We can *rank* responses based on past behaviour. Therefore, we need a measure of the effect of the response.

- Success rate; did we recover?
- Response time; how fast did we recover?
- Impact; How much was lost?





Efficiency

Impact Timeout Threshold (Baseline) B

Importance	α
Not recovered boundary	β
Cost integral	Ct
Cost under normal	C
circumstances	-

$$E(\text{recovered or not}, I, Ct) \stackrel{\Delta}{=} \begin{cases} \beta + \alpha \frac{B \cdot T - I}{B \cdot T} + (1 - \beta - \alpha) \frac{C \cdot T - Ct}{C \cdot T} \\ = 1 - \frac{\alpha}{B \cdot T} I - \frac{1 - \beta - \alpha}{C \cdot T} Ct \\ \alpha(\frac{\beta}{1 - \beta}) \frac{B \cdot T - I}{B \cdot T} + (1 - \beta - \alpha)(\frac{\beta}{1 - \beta}) \frac{C \cdot T - Ct}{C \cdot T} \\ = \beta - \alpha \frac{\beta}{(1 - \beta)(B \cdot T)} I - (1 - \beta - \alpha) \frac{\beta}{(1 - \beta)(C \cdot T)} Ct \\ \end{cases} \text{ otherwise,}$$

Because we have no cost measurements we will ignore cost for now. $\beta = 0, \quad \text{all}$

We are only interested in the 'Recovered' situation

Ι

 \overline{T}

Efficiency

Impact Timeout Threshold (baseline)

TB

Efficiency single metric:


 $E_m(recovered, I) \stackrel{\Delta}{=} 1 - \frac{I}{B * T}$


Efficiency defence:


$$E_d \stackrel{\Delta}{=} \sum_{i=1}^n \gamma_i E_{m,i}$$


Efficiency <u>countermeasure</u>:


$$E_c \stackrel{\Delta}{=} S_c * E_d$$











Metrics

<u>Sales</u>: the combined amount of transactions to web services <u>CPU</u>: combined CPU load on the web services <u>logfail</u>: The amount of failed logins

Attack classifications

DDoS_Attack	UDP based DDoS attack causes link congestion	if not <u>Sales</u> > 210
pwd_bf_attack	Password brute force attack causes abnormal login failures	if not <i>logfail</i> < 20
CPU_Attack	DoS attack focused on consuming CPU resources.	if not <u>CPU</u> < 85 and not <u>Sales</u> < 210


Each measurement is repeated 50 times.


We vary the following parameters:


- Response timeout: 30-40-60s
- Attack size: Light, Medium, Heavy


The recorded values are *averaged* over a moving window of 10 samples.

For impact we use a ceiling of 2 * threshold to prevent the impact of unbounded metrics from growing out of scale towards infinity.










Example: DDos attack (Bonus)



Attack	Defence		Size	
		Light	Medium	Heavy
CPU_attack	captcha	68	10	0
	honeypot	100	100	100
	udp-filter	0	0	0
	udp-rateup	0	0	0
pwd_bf_attack	captcha	100	100	100
	honeypot	100	100	100
	udp-filter	0	0	0
	udp-rateup	0	0	0
DDoS_attack	captcha	0	0	0
	honeypot	6	0	0
	udp-filter	100	100	100
	udp-rateup	64	0	0

Attack	Defence		Size	
		Light	Medium	Heavy
CPU_attack	captcha	68	10	0
	honeypot	100	100	100
	udp-filter	0	0	0
	udp-rateup	0	0	0
pwd_bf_attack	captcha	100	100	100
	honeypot	100	100	100
	udp-filter	0	0	0
	udp-rateup	0	0	0
DDoS_attack	captcha	0	0	0
	honeypot	6	0	0
	udp-filter	100	100	100
	udp-rateup	64	0	0

Attack	Defence		Size	
		Light	Medium	Heavy
CPU_attack	captcha	68	10	0
	honeypot	100	100	100
	udp-filter	0	0	0
	udp-rateup	0	0	0
pwd_bf_attack	captcha	100	100	100
	honeypot	100	100	100
	udp-filter	0	0	0
	udp-rateup	0	0	0
DDoS_attack	captcha	0	0	0
	honeypot	6	0	0
	udp-filter	100	100	100
	udp-rateup	64	0	0

Attack	Defence		Size	
		Light	Medium	Heavy
CPU_attack	captcha	68	10	0
	honeypot	100	100	100
	udp-filter	0	0	0
	udp-rateup	0	0	0
pwd_bf_attack	captcha	100	100	100
	honeypot	100	100	100
	udp-filter	0	0	0
	udp-rateup	0	0	0
DDoS_attack	captcha	0	0	0
	honeypot	6	0	0
	udp-filter	100	100	100
	udp-rateup	64	0	0



Efficiency of countermeasures

(50 attempts)

Attack	Defence		Size	
		Light	Medium	Heavy
CPU_attack	captcha	0.44	0.04	0.00
	honeypot	0.98	0.98	0.97
pwd_bf_attack	captcha	0.94	0.94	0.94
	honeypot	0.94	0.94	0.94
DDoS_attack	udp-filter	1.00	1.00	0.99
	udp-rateup	0.35	0.00	0.00

Based on the defence efficiency a SARNET will make the following choices

	First choice	Second choice
CPU_attack	captcha	honeypot
pwd_bf_attack	honeypot/captcha	-
DDoS_attack	udp-filter	-
DDoS_attack (light)	udp-filter	udp-rateup

Determining efficiency is a first step towards ranking countermeasures and self learning.

Efficiency is *universal* enough to apply and compare on new countermeasures.

Current work: multi-domain

Randomize

Start

Advance

Stop

Express

UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM Secure Autonomous Response Network Collaboration: 0 1 reflect Level Solution Time 0 Local filter Failed 1 Rateup Failed Filter 00:36.085 00 50 0 Password attack DDoS Reflect

Contact:

Ralph Koning r.koning _at_ uva.nl

https://staff.fnwi.uva.nl/r.koning/

https://sarnet.uvalight.net

Research made possible by:











Universiteit van Amsterdam

