
### Smart and Secure Cyber Infrastructure.

Cees de Laat System & Network Engineering University of Amsterdam









1,572,877 GByte/minute = (8\*1,572,877\*10^9/60 bit/s)/(10\*10^12 bit/s per fiber) = 21 fibers with each about 100 \* 100 Gb/s channels



Home World Rusiness Markets Opinion Arts Life Real Estate Politics Economy Tech



PERSONAL TECHNOLOGY The Cable Cutting Dream Is









### **Trucks of Tapes**

#### TECH

### Amazon Uses Trucks to Drive Data Faster

Cloud-computing unit, Amazon Web Services, unveils new offerings at annual conference in Las Vegas

The tractor-trailer hauls a massive storage device, dubbed Snowmobile, in the form of a 45-foot shipping container that holds 100 petabytes of data. A petabyte is about 1 million gigabytes.



Most Popular

U.S. to F Least \$10

Student

Coming

**Opinion:** 

Trump's

Pick Sca

Trump's

His Busi

Draws O

Creator

Mac Dies

Trump's

Choice S

.

The company, however, isn't promising lightning speed. Ten Snowmobiles would reduce the time it takes to move an exabyte from on-premises storage to Amazon's cloud to a little less than six months, from about 26 years using a high-speed internet connection, by the company's calculations.

Amazon unveiled the 'Snowmobile' service on Wednesday in Las Vegas, PHOTO: AMAZON WEB SERVICES

4 COMMENTS

By JAY GREENE By LAURA STEVENS Updated Nov. 30, 2016 7:19 p.m. ET


LAS VEGAS-In Amazon Web Services, Amazon.com Inc. has built one of the most powerful computing networks in the world, on pace to post more than \$12 billion in revenue this year.

But the retail giant on Wednesday proposed a surprising way to move data from large corporate customers' data centers to its public cloud-computing operation: by truck.

Networks can move massive amounts of data only so fast. Trucks, it turns out, can move it faster.


1 fiber does about 16 Tbit/s = 2 Tbyte/s  $\Rightarrow$  500000 s/ExaByte  $\Rightarrow$  One week/ExaByte Or stick Joe and Harvey in a RV for 2 months.


### SKA: Depending on analysis load & physics mode they want to investigate to use SDN in real time to direct bursts of data to different compute resources and do load balancing.




## Learned from Scinet & INDIS

- 2013 2016
  - SDN
  - Security
  - Traffic management, policing, control
  - Hybrid optical ring approach to reach Tb/s
- 2017 2020
  - NFV
  - SDX
  - DTN @ core →
     petabyte email network
  - Data abstractions (e.g. NDN)






### Networks of ScienceDMZ's & SDX's





## Status SARNET Operational Level



- 1. Paper: R. Koning, A. Deljoo, S. Trajanovski, B. de Graaff, P. Grosso, L. Gommans, T. van Engers, F. Fransen, R. Meijer, R. Wilson, and C. de Laat, "Enabling E-Science Applications with Dynamic Optical Networks: Secure Autonomous Response Networks", OSA Optical Fiber Communication Conference and Exposition, 19-23 March 2017, Los Angeles, California.
- 2. Paper: Ralph Koning, Nick Buraglio, Cees de Laat, Paola Grosso, "CoreFlow: Enriching Bro security events using network traffic monitoring data", SC16 Salt Lake City, INDIS workshop, Nov 13, 2016.
- Paper: Ralph Koning, Ben de Graaff, Cees de Laat, Robert Meijer, Paola Grosso, "Analysis of Software Defined Networking defences against Distributed Denial of Service attacks", The IEEE International Workshop on Security in Virtualized Networks (Sec-VirtNet 2016) at the 2nd IEEE International Conference on Network Softwarization (NetSoft 2016), Seoul Korea, June 10, 2016.


## Basic operating system loop





Normal operation

Link load



#### Choose your attack

Start a Distributed Denial of Service attack from all upstream ISP networks:

#### UDP DIggS

Start a specific attack originating from one of the upstream ISP networks:

Origin: e2.edge2.as400

CPU utilization Password attack

Normal operation

#### Object information

e2.edge2.as400


### router communitiestistic to the set of the

### Edge domains flood the network with UDP traffic


Link load

10 25 40 55 70 85 90 100 %


Secure Autonomous Response Network SARNET agent metrics



Secure Autonomous Response Network SARNET agent metrics



### Flow filters are installed at the network edge



#### Choose your attack

Start a Distributed Denial of Service attack from all upstream ISP networks:

#### UDP DIGSS

Start a specific attack originating from one of the upstream ISP networks:

Origin: e2.edge2.as400

CPU utilization Password attack

Normal operation

#### Object information


e2.edge2.as400

## KND router COMPUTE#Dist/Made 16811761-db3b-4e3b-8ae3-2b4f60da0185#img-router comute#securicEE exogeni#XOSmall cc2#workerNopDU uvanI-wn1 request#hvsRcsexver... request#Active acoust#blookup uvanIvmsite.rdf#uvanIvmsite/Domain/vm

#### Service is restored

Link load

10 25 40 55 70 85 90 100 %



The VMs that are live-migrated run an iterative search-refine-search workflow against data stored in different databases at the various locations. A user in San Diego gets hitless rendering of search progress as VMs spin around

# Experiment outcomes Note, this was in 2005!

We have demonstrated seamless, live migration of VMs over WAN

For this, we have realized a network service that Exhibits predictable behavior; tracks endpoints Flex bandwidth upon request by credited applications Doesn't require peak provisioning of network resources
Pirelining bounds the docentime in spite of high RTTS
San Diego – Amsterdam, 1 GE, RTT = 200 msec downtime <= 1 sec</p>
Pack to back, 1GE, RTT = 0.2-0.5 msec, downtime = ~0.2 sec\*


\*Clark et al. Nobr 05 paper. Different workloads

VM + Lightpaths across MAN/WAN are deemed a powerful and general alternative to RPC, GRAM approaches

We believe it's a representative instance of active cpu+data+net orchestration


F. Travostino, P. Daspit, L. Gommans, C. Jog, C.T.A.M. de Laat, J. Mambretti, I. Monga, B. van Oudenaarde, S. Raghunath and P.Y. Wang, "Seamless Live Migration of Virtual Machines over the MAN/WAN", Future Generation Computer Systems, Volume 22, Issue 8, October 2006, Pages 901-907.

### Secure Policy Enforced Data Processing



## Areas of research

- Each domain its own AI on networks.
  - Multiple AI's fighting on my behalf?
- A-B-C slide
  - Where makes what AI sense?
- Many layers of complexity and abstraction.
  - Can AI help to understand and debug?
  - Can it explicitly understand? Reveal a model?
- Probabilities are badly understood in AI
  - How to deal with false positives?
  - Ethical issues?
  - Trust issues?
  - Intention issues?



## Critical notes

- We created complexity
- Huge number of actors (devices)
- Millions of lines of codes
- We have shrinking trust in the Internet
- Let's throw in another hunderd-thousend lines of code! Good luck...
- Complexity encapsulation
- Do we have enough information for RL ML?
- Do we understand what the Machine needs to learn?

### Acknowledgements

overhead production

overhead

production

 $\odot$ 

### WP 20.3 SeSI: Security of (Virtual) e-Science Infrastructure

Cees de Laat Matthijs Koot, Leon Gommans, Guido van 't Noordeinde



WP 20.11 SARNET: Security Autonomous Response with programmable NETworks

Cees de Laat Leon Gommans, Rodney Wilson, Rob Meijer Tom van Engers, Marc Lyonnais, Paola Grosso, Frank Fransen, Ameneh Deljoo, Ralph Koning, Ben de Graaff, Gleb Polevoy

AIRFRANCE KLM SEE VIE SCENT CONNIC

## Why?



## Because we can!