

# Measuring Performance Overhead of Trans-encrypting HTTP Adaptive Streaming

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July 4, 2017

University of Amsterdam  
TNO Media-lab

## Problem

Major leaks of blockbuster titles.

## Problem

Major leaks

# How Hollywood Got Hacked: Studio at Center of Netflix Leak Breaks Silence (EXCLUSIVE)



**Janko Roettgers**  
Senior Silicon Valley Correspondent  
@jank0

HOLLYWOOD

## Hacker Group Says 'Hollywood Is Under Attack' After Latest TV Leak

Tom Huddleston, Jr.  
Jun 07, 2017

The hacking collective known as [The Dark Overlord](#) is claiming that "Hollywood is under attack" after the group's [latest leak](#) of previously unreleased television episodes online earlier this week.

🏠 > News

## Broadcasters fear release of more hit shows after Dark Overlord claims leak of Orange Is The New Black

### Dark Overlord strikes again: Mysterious hacker leaks new ABC TV show

Published: 7 Jun 2017, 14:14

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## Problem

Major leaks of blockbuster titles.

- Push to better secure DRM pipeline.

## Problem

Major leaks of blockbuster titles.

- Push to better secure DRM pipeline.

## Solution

Testing trans-encryption as an alternate form of encryption for the DRM pipeline.

# Research question

- What is the performance overhead of doing a trans-encryption step for HTTP Adaptive Streaming.
  - How can available hardware efficiently be used to trans-encrypt content.

# Background

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# HTTP Adaptive streaming

- Segment(ed/able) video.
- Manifest
- Four flavours:
  - Microsoft HTTP Smooth Streaming (HSS)
  - Adobe HTTP Dynamic Streaming (HDS)
  - Apple HTTP Live Streaming (HLS)
  - MPEG Dynamic Adaptive Streaming over HTTP (DASH)
- Traditional HTTP client/server architecture.



# HTTP Adaptive streaming

Server




Diagram showing simplified content preparation for HTTP Adaptive Streaming.

# HTTP Adaptive streaming

Client




Diagram showing simplified adaptive algorithm for HTTP Adaptive Streaming.

1. Common Encryption Scheme (CENC)
  - AES-128 Cipher Block Chaining (CBC)
  - AES-128 Counter (CTR)

# Digital Rights Management

## Components

1. Common Encryption Scheme (CENC)
  - AES-128 Cipher Block Chaining (CBC)
  - AES-128 Counter (CTR)
2. Browser

# Digital Rights Management

## Components

1. Common Encryption Scheme (CENC)
  - AES-128 Cipher Block Chaining (CBC)
  - AES-128 Counter (CTR)
2. Browser
3. DRM Systems & License Servers
  - Google Widevine
  - Microsoft Playready
  - Apple Fairplay
  - Adobe Primetime
  - Others (OSS also)

# Digital Rights Management

## Intermission

1.

2.

3.

Platform Native DRM Support

Please note that this table is a general guideline listing the DRM supported by popular platforms and devices. While we list the *built-in* DRM support that ships with each, there may be other methods of enabling additional DRM systems such as implementing an SDK. For example, our [castLabs PRESTOplay SDKs](#) provide additional DRM support for playback on iOS and Android devices.

HTML5 Browsers	PlayReady	Widevine MODULAR	Widevine CLASSIC	FairPlay	Primetime (ACCESS)	Marlin	CMLA-OMA
Chrome (35+)	✗	✓	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗
Firefox (38+ on Windows)	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗
Firefox (47+ on Windows & Mac) <sup>1</sup>	✗	✓	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗
Internet Explorer (11+ on Windows 8.1+)	✓	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗
Microsoft Edge (Windows 10+)	✓	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗
Opera (31+)	✗	✓	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗
Safari (8+ on OS X)	✗	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗	✗
Plugins & Run-time Environments	PlayReady	Widevine MODULAR	Widevine CLASSIC	FairPlay	Primetime (ACCESS)	Marlin	CMLA-OMA
Adobe Flash / AIR	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗
Silverlight	✓	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗
Mobile	PlayReady	Widevine MODULAR	Widevine CLASSIC	FairPlay	Primetime (ACCESS)	Marlin	CMLA-OMA
Android (4.3+)	✗	✓	✓	✗	✗	✗	✗
Android (3+)	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗	✗	✗
iOS (6+)	✗	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗	✗
Windows Phone	✓	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗
<a href="#">castLabs PRESTOplay SDKs FOR IOS &amp; ANDROID</a>	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓

# Digital Rights Management

## Components

1. Common Encryption Scheme (CENC)
  - AES-128 Cipher Block Chaining (CBC)
  - AES-128 Counter (CTR)
2. Browser
3. DRM Systems & License Servers
  - Google Widevine
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  - Adobe Primetime
  - Others
4. Encrypted Media Extensions (EME)

# Digital Rights Management

## Components

1. Common Encryption Scheme (CENC)
  - AES-128 Cipher Block Chaining (CBC)
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2. Browser
3. DRM Systems & License Servers
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  - Others
4. Encrypted Media Extensions (EME)
5. Content Decryption Module (CDM)




# Approach

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# Split-key cryptosystem

## Theory

$$D_{d1,d2}(E_{e2}(E_{e1}(X))) = X$$



### Trans-encryption<sup>1</sup>

- RSA
- One time path
- LFSR stream cipher
- ElGamal
- Damgard-Jurik

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<sup>1</sup>As per patent: Secure distribution of content.

### Trans-encryption<sup>2</sup>


- RSA - Widely standardized.
- One time path - Keysize increases with 100% keysize per trans-encryption.
- LFSR stream cipher - A number of insecure applications..
- ElGamal - Similar performance, hangs on discrete log, less standardized.
- Damgard-Jurik - No notable implementations.

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<sup>2</sup>As per patent: Secure distribution of content.

# Split-key cryptosystem

RSA



$$E(X) = X^e \pmod{n}$$

$$D(X) = X^d \pmod{n}$$

# Split-key cryptosystem

## Implementation

### RSA

- Generate Pair 1 (Public & Private)
- Create Pair 2 (same mod) and Combined pair (Pair 1  $\times$  Pair 2)
- Encrypt (Pair 1/Combined)
- Trans-encrypt (Encryption/Decryption 1)
- Client-decrypt (Decryption combined/Decryption 2)

# Split-key cryptosystem

## Implementation

### RSA-2048

- *openssl genrsa*
- **C** *rsa\_create\_combined*
- **Python** *encrypt.py* + **C** *rsa\_encrypt*
- **C** *rsa\_trans/rsa\_trans\_dec*
- **C** *rsa\_client\_decrypt*

# HTTP server

Japrnto?

## Requirements

- Low overhead
- Simple
- Fast
- Free? (Opensourced)


## Solution

**Japrnto**




# HTTP server

Japronto!



A graph by the author *squeaky-pl* showing the performance of japronto.

## Experimental Set-up




A diagram showing the experimental set-up.

# Results

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# Results



## Conclusion

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## Conclusion

Server-side trans-encryption with the public exponent is possible

## Drawback

Client-side decryption will prove tough on the performance

## Future work

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## Future work

Possibly implement a decrypting client.




Questions?

# Academic RSA factorization records

## Hostile factorizations

(Year-2000)-32+512 bits



A graph showing factorization efforts <sup>3</sup>